The Construction of Social Reality

The Construction of Social Reality

• John Searle explores how objective social realities like money and government arise from human agreement in a world of physical particles. He argues that language is crucial in creating these "institutional facts," which exist because we believe they do.

• Discover how language shapes social structures.

• Understand the building blocks of social reality.

• Explore the difference between brute and institutional facts.

• Learn about the interplay of mind, language, and society.

Core Content:

1. Social Reality and Institutional Facts:

• Objective vs. Subjective: Searle distinguishes between facts like Mt. Everest's snow, which are independent of human opinion (objective), and institutional facts like currency value, which depend on human agreement (subjective).
• Language Dependency: Institutional facts require language because they are partially constituted by thoughts and representations, which rely on shared, symbolic systems.
• Objective Reality: Searle aims to show how this seemingly "constructed" social reality fits within a larger, objective physical reality.

2. Status Functions and Constitutive Rules:

• X Counts as Y in C: Institutional facts follow the pattern "X counts as Y in context C," where X is a brute fact that gains a new status and function (Y) through collective agreement.
• The Y Status: The Y term confers a status and function that X couldn't achieve on its own.
• Collective Intentionality: The Y status relies on collective intentionality, where people accept and recognize its existence.

3. The Role of Language:

• Language as Constitutive: Language isn't just for describing; it actively shapes institutional facts.
• Points in Games: The concept of "points" in a game only exists relative to a system of representation and counting, as there is nothing "there" without the symbolic devices.
• From X to Y: The shift from X to Y involves a symbolic move that needs markers because the Y element doesn't exist independently.

4. Objective and Subjective:

• Epistemic vs. Ontological: Epistemic objectivity concerns judgments verifiable by facts (e.g., "That's a $20 bill"). Ontological subjectivity concerns the existence of entities (e.g., money exists due to collective belief).
• Functional Facts: Attributing a function to something (e.g., "This is a screwdriver") is an ontologically subjective fact.

5. The Hierarchy of Facts:

• Mental and Non-Mental: Searle classifies facts into mental (intentional and non-intentional) and non-mental (brute physical) categories.
• Functional Facts: The assignment of functions creates "functional facts".
• Status-Functions: These are agentive functions that can only be performed through collective agreement.

6. The Background and Social Phenomena:

• Unconscious Rules: Searle rejects the idea that we unconsciously follow complex rules of institutions. Instead, we have "Background" abilities that enable us to interact with them.
• Sensitivity to Rules: Our behavior is sensitive to the structure of rules, without necessarily representing those rules.

7. Realism and External Reality:

• External Realism: There is a real world independent of our thoughts and representations.
• Correspondence: True statements correspond to facts in the real world.
• Critiques of Realism: Searle addresses attacks on realism from conceptual relativity, verificationism, and the idea of "things in themselves" (Ding an sich).

8. Language and Institutional Facts:

• Institutional facts require language because language is partially constitutive of those facts. Without language, these facts cannot exist.

Q&A

Q: What are institutional facts, and how are they different from brute facts?

A: Institutional facts, like money or marriage, exist because of human agreement and institutions, while brute facts, like the existence of mountains, exist independently of human opinion.

Q: How does language play a role in constructing social reality?

A: Language is fundamental; most (or all) institutional facts require some system of representation. The linguistic element is partially constitutive of the fact, enabling us to represent and collectively assign status-functions.

Q: How does Searle address the potential for circularity in defining institutional concepts?

A: The potential circularity of concepts is avoided by widening the circle to include other institutional concepts, but the system must ultimately rest on brute facts.

Q: What is collective intentionality, and why is it important for social reality?

A: Collective intentionality refers to a shared sense of wanting, believing, or doing something together. It is fundamental for the creation of social facts, as it represents the underlying agreement that enables status-functions.

Q: What is the basic structure of constitutive rules, and how does it work?

A: The basic structure is "X counts as Y in C," where X is assigned a new status and function Y through collective agreement. This creates institutional facts, and the formula is iterated to build complex social institutions.